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Abstract: This article examines crime control in post-Communist states. 
Comprising crime, risk, and security, the article argues that security is a notion 
comprised of paradoxes and complexities, much like the respective histories and 
experiences of the Central and East European (CEE) states. Whilst positive 
steps have been made since the collapse of Communism in 1989 and entry into 
the European Union on the part of eight CEE countries in 2004, and another two 
in 2007, research in this area shows a divergence in traditional and local 
concerns as concerns crime and security. Continuing to be shaped by 
Communist rule, the manner in which these assert themselves may be at odds 
with global patterns of thought, providing a critical portrait of post-Communist 
Europe. As observed by Ismail Kadare ‘[t]he only way you can get a grip on a 
place overcome by paranoia is by becoming a little paranoid yourself.1 This 
analysis demonstrates that much work is needed on the part of the European 
Union and CEE states to ensure that appropriate security strategies are 
implemented to strengthen democratic values and the rule of law. Ideally this 
process entails an appreciation of local values and cultural patterns. 
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Security is certainly a puzzle – the state’s guarantee to ensure law and order is 
an important promise to society, and one laden with controversy. Critical 
questions concerning the transformation of crime control models, the reasons 
underpinning particular decisions and their ensuing consequences, are not only 
alluring, but paramount. ‘The worldview has long since been overlaid by a desire 
for security that relies upon false promises by governments and wilful blindness 
to the facts of crime by individuals…it is a puzzle why the myth of personal safety 
is so powerful and enduring’.2 
Recent scholarship in this area has explored the concept of security 
through various lenses, investigating, inter alia, questions regarding 
terminology;3 security and governance;4 and contemporary crime control.5 
Several scholars, notably Zedner, and Edwards and Hughes, acknowle
need for comparative research, so that we may better appreciate how the 
concept of security operates in different local contexts, indicating peculiar 
dge the 
                                                 
2 L. Zedner, ‘The Concept of Security: an Agenda for Comparative Analysis’, 23 Legal Studies 
(2003), p. 157; also by the same author, ‘The Pursuit of Security’, in T. Hope and R. Sparks, eds., 
Crime, Risk, and Insecurity (London 2000) p. 203. 
3 See, for example, L. Zedner (2003), loc. cit., pp. 153-176. 
4 See, for example, A. Edwards and G. Hughes, ‘Comparing the Governance of Safety in Europe: 
a Geo-Historical Analysis’, 9 Theoretical Criminology (2005) pp. 345-363 and S. Roché, 
‘Prevention and Security: a New Governance Model for France through a Contract-Based 
Territorial Approach’, 47 Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice (2005) pp. 407-
426.  
5 See L. Zedner, ‘Policing Before and After the Police’, 46 British Journal of Criminology (2006) 
pp. 78-96; C. O’Reilly and G. Ellison, ‘‘Eye Spy Private Eye’: Re-conceptualizing High Policing 
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relations between the state, which specifically include its public and private arm
and the role of civil society. Bauman’s claim that ‘[t]he trouble with the 
contemporary condition of our modern civilization [which] is that it stopped
questioning itself’, further stresses the importance of
s, 
 
 comparative research.6  
red 
 a 
                                                                                                                                                
 This article investigates crime control in Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE) in the Communist and post-Communist periods, in an effort to identify how 
current policies concerning crime, risk, and security, shaped in large part by the 
European Union (EU), especially in the human rights area, meet societal 
perceptions of security in CEE.  Such an exploration is not only relevant to the 
CEE, but also in the wider context of Europe, as eight post-Communist states 
entered the EU7 in 2004, and two more8 in 1 January 2007. Despite the EU 
trying to assert a strong lead in shaping respective CEE crime control models, a 
current examination of security in Europe shows that Europe itself has ente
an uncertain terrain, sending conflicting messages to CEE countries that reflect
warm welcome and, at the same time, an evident concern related to its borders. 
The resulting notion of Europe’s ‘fortress mentality’ arose from tensions between 
the internal and external security policies of the EU, an area governed by a 
branch of the EU that has undergone serious reform.9 As noted by Grabbe, 
 
Theory’, 46 British Journal of Criminology (2006) pp. 641-660; and A.-M. Singh, ‘Private Security 
and Crime Control’, 9 Theoretical Criminology (2005) pp. 153-174.  
6 Z. Bauman, Globalization: The Human Consequences (Cambridge 1998), p. 5. 
7 Estonia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia.  
8 Bulgaria and Romania. 
9 H. Grabbe, ‘The Sharp Edges of Europe: Extending Schengen Eastwards’, 76 International 
Affairs (2000), pp. 481-514. 
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‘justice and home affairs is a policy area renowned for its obscurity and lack of 
transparency in public debate’.10  
This puzzle of security is not complete without exploring the location and 
use of fear. Some ‘transitologists’ and other scholars of post-totalitarian and post-
authoritarian societies claim that remnants of Communist rule have shaped and 
transformed themselves in ways that effect the setting up of democratic rule.11 
Nowhere is this clearer that the area of crime control. 
  The first part of this article considers crime control under former 
Communist rule. Crime control was an important part of a repressive criminal 
justice system and the criminal law was utilised as an instrumental tool.12 
Punishment was an important component of maintaining law and order and 
repressive measures were used against specific targets (namely political 
opposition) and symbolically (such as in the case of the crime of vagrancy or 
speculation).13  The use of harsh and repressive punishment under Communist 
rule reveals that security operated as an illusion on two levels: the promise of law 
and order on the part of the state and the unique picture of crime projected both 
as a fear and non-existent feature of the state.14 As articulated by Kadare, '[T]he 
brain of a tyrant often worked according to what might be called the “architecture 
                                                 
10 H. Grabbe, loc. cit., p. 503. 
11 See, for example, R.A. May and A.K. Milton, eds., (Un)Civil Societies: Human Rights and 
Democratic Transitions in Eastern Europe and Latin America (Lanham 2005). 
12 See S. Frankowski, , ‘Post-Communist Europe’, in P. Hodgkinson and A. Rutherford eds., 
Capital Punishment: Global Issues and Prospects (Winchester 1996) p. 217. 
13 See M. Łoś, Communist Ideology, Law and Crime: A Comparative View of the USSR and 
Poland (New York 1988) pp. 26-56. 
14 See M. Łoś, ‘Crime in Transition: The Post-Communist State, Markets and Crime’, 40 Crime, 
Law and Social Change (2003) pp. 145-169. 
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of terror”. Terror was constructed backwards, like dreams, which is to say, 
starting from the end.’15 
The analysis serves as a starting point in assessing progress of CEE 
states following enlargement, considered in the second section. The examination 
demonstrates that while the CEE traditionally, and rightly, sees itself as part of 
Europe,16 respective domestic policies reveal a divergence that unmasks a 
particular shift in governance and crime control, which has a paradoxical flavour. 
The final section addresses how the ‘punitive’ nature of CEE societies 
may hold the key to the particular approach and perspective on security. Case 
studies focus the capital punishment as a component of the ‘punitive’ state. The 
extent to which present transformations of the CEE state and questioning its 
current place in the area of crime control in Europe has on the ‘politics of 
(in)security’17 raises key questions concerning the nature of democracy in the 
CEE and further, broader consequences for Europe. This examination of the 
post-Communist period once again confirms the complex nature of CEE 
histories. Indeed, ‘postcommunism is a multi-faceted, heterogeneous 
phenomenon shot through with paradoxes while at the same time revealing the 
underlying paradigmatic shifts, not only in theory but also in reality, of our 
times.’18 
 
                                                 
15 I. Kadare, op. cit., p. 154. 
16 See, for example, T. Judt, Postwar: a History of Europe since 1945 (London 2005). 
17 See I. Loader and R. Sparks, ‘Contemporary Landscapes of Crime, Order, and Control: 
Governance, Risk, and Globalisation’, in M. Maguire, R. Morgan, and R. Reiner., eds., The 
Oxford Handbook of Criminology, 3rd edn. (Oxford 2002) p. 84. 
18 R. Sakwa, Postcommunism (Buckingham, UK 1999) p. 7. 
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2. Crime Control under Communism (1945-1989) 
According to Fatić, a moral and cultural order is comprised of certain values, 
which allows us to perceive the law as a normative framework within which a 
network of legitimate mutual expectations between members of society are 
established – this, in turn, breathes life into the notion of 'social capital trust'.19  In 
the CEE, for nearly forty years the ‘state was central to the Soviet communism 
and, therefore, any research on what followed that system has to account for the 
transformation of the old state’s structures and mentality’.20  
Łoś aptly notes that the Soviet state’s domain once entailed public spaces 
that are now viewed as private spaces or property. This includes the area of 
criminal justice. The type of crime control model that was established under 
Communist rule was based on Marxist-Leninist ideology. For a brief but 
significant time this ideology was dictated by Stalinist thought (1944-1953).21  
This was characterised by a regime that mirrored the ‘cult of personality’ that 
shaped Soviet Communist rule.22  Even before the Second World War ended, 
the region’s criminal law policies were created by provisional governments set up
in the region, which passed decrees that were for the most part ordained by th
Soviet government in Moscow.
 
e 
                                                
23 This meant that criminal laws were geared to 
 
19 A. Fatić, Crime and Social Control on 'Central'-Eastern Europe (Aldershot 1997) p. 7. 
20 M. Łoś (2003), loc. cit., p. 147. 
21 See G. Hodos, Show Trials: Stalinist Purges in Eastern Europe, 1948-1954 (New York 1987). 
See also K.M. Piekarska, ‘Naruszanie zasady jawności w “sądach tajnych”’ (Violation of the 
Principle of Open Proceedings in the “Secret Courts”), 27 Studia Iuridica (1995) pp. 25-41. 
22 M. Łoś, op .cit., and G. Hodos, op. cit. See also K.M Piekarska, loc.cit. For understanding the 
‘cult of personality’ see R. Medvedev, Let History Judge: the Origins and Consequences of 
Stalinism (New York 1971).  
23 The provisions of the Polish Military Criminal Code from 28 September 1944 concerning state 
security, which were carried over from the 1932 code, were also applied to civilians after the war. 
The provisions foresaw 11 crimes which called for the death penalty, which were targeted at 
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target the elimination of political opposition as viewed by Soviet officials, which 
included a wide range of professions and members of the intelligentsia. Decrees 
that identified as criminal collaboration with ‘fascists’ masked the underlying 
motive on the part of Soviet leaders to dispose of members of the underground, 
especially those who led successful operations during the war. Secret trials, as 
well as show trials, defined the repressive nature of the regime. The essence of 
these trials relied on evidence obtained through interrogation methods that 
present-day would clearly violate principles set out in Articles 5 (personal liberty) 
and 6 (fair trial) of the European Convention on Human Rights. Although the 
‘dark period’ nominally ended with Stalin’s death aspects survived that would 
drive this repressive apparatus until its demise in 1989.24 The role of security 
services, across CEE, played a paramount role in supporting a regime of tyranny 
and terror throughout Communist rule. The core of this philosophy is aptly 
summed up by the police network that was created in Yugoslavia, for example, 
that aimed to ‘strike terror into the hearts of those who do not like this sort of 
Yugoslavia’.25  
Thus, several meanings could be attached to notions of security, crime, 
and risk, as seen from the perspective of the state and citizen. It is useful to think 
of the state institutions traditionally connected with crime control (police, courts, 
prisons, for example) to have, over the decades, ‘become infused with, and 
                                                                                                                                                 
potential political opponents. Without changing the Polish criminal code, but introducing new 
types of crimes to the text, the draconian manner in which the authorities wished to turn the code 
into a repressive tool was revealed. See A. Fijalkowski, ‘The Abolition of the Death Penalty in 
Central and Eastern Europe’, 9 Tilburg Foreign Law Review (2001) pp. 62-83. 
24 Soviet leaders were keen to keep files on each other; a practice perfected by Stalin, these files 
would later serve as blackmail or elimination of colleagues. 
25 T. Judt, op. cit., p. 173. 
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shaped by, some specific ways of thinking and acting in relation to crime and its 
control’.26 Indeed, one of the main objectives behind the wave of repression, i.e., 
show trials, was to ‘mobilise public opinion’, according to which courts would 
‘educate citizens in devotion and loyalty toward the [People’s] Republic’, which 
had its roots in the teachings of Stalin’s top jurist and architect of the show trial, 
Andrei Vyshinsky.27 But the true meaning is masked: in fact the citizen is not 
asked to believe in the information, but merely to repeat it. In other words, this 
was ‘training in repetition’.28 ‘The media’s role was to school and mobilize the 
population’.29 Further, the fact that the trials were clearly based on falsified 
testimonies might hint that they were meant to seek justice, when in fact they 
demonstrated the power of the Soviet system in showing the public with whom 
the blame lie, and with whom the reward for loyalty and subservience rested.30 A 
‘multiplicity of strategies, techniques, and rationalities’31 characterise the state 
with no seeming ‘sovereign actor able to steer or regulate’.32 The Communist 
regime had to maintain that crime would ‘wither’ away as the society drew closer 
towards Communism, yet it had to, at the same time, take on a stronger role, 
which meant that vigilance had to be maintained for opposition to Marxist-
Leninist ideals could be identified within society. This paradoxical role would 
                                                 
26 I. Loader and R. Sparks, loc. cit., p. 84. 
27 See his The Law of the Soviet State, trans. H. W. Babb (New York, Macmillan, 1961) 
28 T. Judt, op. cit. p. 188. 
29 J.L. Curry, ‘Eastern Europe’s Postcommunist Media’, in . R.A. May and A.K. Milton, eds., 
(Un)civil Societies: Human Rights and Democratic Transitions in Eastern Europe and Latin 
America (Lanham, MD, USA 2005) p. 140. 
30 J.L. Curry, loc. cit., p. 187. 
31 I. Loader and R. Sparks, op. cit., p. 87. 
32 R. Rhodes, Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and 
Accountability (Buckingham 1997) p. 57. 
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imply that the distinction between state and civil society becomes blurred.33 The 
overlap between the two was fear. ‘Fear often drives those who foster fear’.34 
 
2.1 Crime control and fear 
Indeed, at the heart of the crime control model that was imposed on CEE states 
was fear. ‘Fear was the first principle buttressing Soviet-style control. A key to 
communist societies’ stability was the well-internalised fear of the party-state and 
its seemingly omnipresent security forces’.35 In this constellation, the ‘multiple 
relations of power traverse, characterize, and constitute the social body; they are 
indissociable from a discourse of truth…’36 Judt notes that Eastern European 
politics and government became equated with corruption and indiscriminate 
suppression, ‘practiced by and for the benefit of a venal clique, itself rent by 
suspicion and fear’.37 
From the citizens’ perspective, crime took on a paradoxical meaning. Łoś 
describes how the imprisonment of a parent owing to membership in the 
opposition movement could be seen as heroic among peers and the outside.38 
What was viewed as criminal was the state making certain acts, such as political 
opposition, criminal. At another level, a significant factor contributing to the 
                                                 
33 R. Rhodes, loc.cit., p. 57. 
34 M. Łoś, ‘Post-communist Fear of Crime and the Commercialization of Security’, 6 Theoretical 
Criminology (2002), p. 169. 
35 M. Łoś (2002), loc. cit., p. 169 
36 M. Foucault, Society Must be Defended, trans. D. Macey (London 2003) p. 24. See also M. Łoś 
(2002), loc. cit., as well as M. Foucault, ‘Governmentality’, in G. Burchill, C. Gordon, and P. Miller, 
eds., The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality (Hemel Hampstead, UK 1991) and key 
works in governmentality, such as D. Garland, ‘Governmentality and the Problem of Crime: 
Foucault, Criminology, Sociology’, 1 Theoretical Criminology (1997) pp. 173-214. 
37 T Judt, op. cit., p. 194. 
38 M. Łoś, op. cit., pp. 52-53. 
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paradoxical meaning concerns the role of informal networks that allowed 
individuals access to certain goods and services that were not delivered by the 
state. Some scholars term this as ‘dirty togetherness’,39 a complicity in 
participating in illegal acts that undoubtedly reverberates on how the individual 
perceives crime and security. These ‘perverse forms of loyalty based on a matrix 
of different, more or less connected, partnerships aiming at making use of all 
formal and official structures in order to take them over for private goals’.40 
Because of these different vantage points, society had to adopt a means 
of coping. In other words, certain attitudes and mentalities had to be adopted to 
help adapt to circumstances that did not allow individuals the scope to voice their 
concerns about crime. Łoś identifies these as ‘control’ and ‘taboo’ mentalities.41 
The former relates to the Communist regime’s control formula, which centred on 
‘specific technologies that sought to restrain agency, contain population 
movement and communication and produce captive populations through state 
monopolies over employment, trade unions and social organisations’.42 The 
‘taboo mentality’ emerges ‘[i]n the absence of clear rules, institutional guarantees 
or a rationality-based political culture, [propelling] each individual almost 
instinctively [to mark] for him or herself the taboo areas to avoid’.43  
Bourke’s work on fear may provide a further explanation. In differentiating 
between fear and anxiety, Bourke aptly highlights the boundaries between an 
‘immediate, objective threat’ (fear) and an ‘anticipated, subjective threat’ 
                                                 
39 See A. Podgórecki, Polish Society (London 1994) p. 115. 
40 A. Podgórecki, op. cit. 
41 M. Łoś, op. cit. 
42 M. Łoś, op. cit., p. 171. 
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(anxiety).44 Bourke discusses how the uncertainty of anxiety can be addressed 
by naming an enemy (i.e. ‘them’) a process which transforms anxiety into fear. 
Thus, debates about crime can be a reflection of change more generally 
(collapse of Communism, introduction of free markets) which can be used to 
control subordinate groups, as was done under Communist rule and maintaining 
control over potential political opposition. ‘When modern individuals become 
plagued by anxiety (rather than fear) states, they prove less dependent upon 
associative groups and more prepared to adopt individualistic solutions’.45 Social 
networks, therefore, play an integral role in maintaining cohesion in the face of 
the enemy – ‘us v. them’.46 
 
2.2 Paradoxical expectations concerning law and order 
Despite seeing the regime as lacking legitimacy, the expectation that the state 
would maintain law and order was very much alive. Pavarini provides an analysis 
of this paradox, arguing that ‘[i]nstitutional and public efforts to provide 
safeguards against criminality are perceived as being unable to meet the social 
demand for security; again, whether this is actually the case is another matter’.47 
For example, a community such as Polish society traditionally could be defined 
as expecting the state to play a strong role in combating crime, in other words, 
‘punitive’, a factor that dates back to pre-war period. Polish ‘cultural life’ with 
                                                                                                                                                 
43 M. Łoś, op. cit., p. 171. 
44 J. Bourke, Fear: A Cultural History (London 2005) p. 189. 
45 J. Bourke, op. cit., p. 191. 
46 See T.G. Ash, The Polish Revolution: Solidarity (London 1984). 
47 M. Pavarini, ‘Controlling Social Panic: Questions and Answers about Security in Italy at the End 
of the Millenium’, in R. Bergalli and C. Sumner, eds., Social Control and Political Order: European 
Perspectives at the End of the Century (London 1997) p. 79. 
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respect to punishment is one that is very much shaped by sensibilities and 
mentalities.48 In this respect, Polish history seems to reflect the Hobbesian model 
of the state; a social contract between individuals who surrender certain liberties, 
personal assets and rights to a ‘sovereign’ who, in turn, guarantees their 
personal safety. This paradox is aptly described by Kadare, who writes: 
Everyone realised that the material piling up inside them was contradictory 
and incoherent, to such a degree that even the most persistent analysis 
ended up making the same gesture of despair as everyone else and 
declaring, with arms thrown wide: The only way you can get a grip on a 
place overcome by paranoia is by becoming a little paranoid yourself.49 
 
Former dissident and president of former Czechoslovakia Vaclav Havel 
understood this process very well.50 Resistance against various modes of 
repression in its tumultuous history has kept CEE societies, respective cultures, 
languages, and traditions alive under various conditions of oppression. These 
strategies of resistance were both concrete and symbolic and very much an 
important part of the strategy for survival during long periods of imposed rule.51  
Alongside this a state of anxiety exists, which the state, in its totalitarian 
and post-totalitarian form, recognises and exploits. ‘A lot of tension accumulates 
around the quest for safety. And where there is a tension, political capital will 
surely be spotted by bright investors and expedient stockbrokers’.52 In sum, 
                                                 
48 A. Fijalkowski, 'Capital Punishment in Poland: an Aspect of the ‘Cultural Life’ of the Death 
Penalty Discourse', in A. Sarat and C. Boulanger, eds., The Cultural Lives of Capital Punishment: 
Comparative Perspectives (Stanford 2005) pp. 147-168. 
49 I. Kadare, op. cit., p. 20. 
50 V. Havel, ‘Reflections on a Paradoxical Life’, 37 The New York Review of Books 14 June 1990. 
51 Concerning the Polish experience, the first partition on the part of Russia took place in 1795 
and resulted in the country’s disappearance off of the map until 1918; followed eleven years later 
by German and Soviet occupation from 1939 until 1944; and, finally, Communist rule which lasted 
from 1945 until 1939. 
52 Z. Bauman, Globalisation: The Human Consequences (Cambridge 1998) p. 117. 
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crime control under Communist rule was characterised by terror and repression 
that had its roots in the Stalinist period, which continued to exist under various 
guises until its collapse. Society had to adapt ways to cope with these measures 
aimed at disciplining,53 yet at the same time held on to expectations that law and 
order would be maintained by the state.  
The effects of the totalitarian regime – ‘one which is omnipotent, 
omnipresent, and which has no space for private freedom’, 54 which presents 
itself as perfect, not flawless, contributes to its mystical nature: it does not need 
to be clear about power, compounded in the sense of uncertainty in dealing with 
the unknown. Łoś argues that the way in which crime was reported deprived 
people of the tools to talk about their fears; instead crime remained a private 
issue.55 Indeed, no space was created for criticism; likewise, no space was 
created for the private citizen. In consequence, a fear of personal safety was 
created. This personal safety could be extended to the fear of personal liberty 
that came with the introduction of democratic reforms. This factor has been used 
in media reporting and populist campaigns, as seen in the next section, which 
considers the paradoxical relationship in the post-Communist period, namely the 
effect of existing remnants of Communist rule on post-Communist crime control 
models. Alongside this EU enlargement has had its own peculiar effect as well. 
 
 
                                                 
53 M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison (London 1991) 
54 M. Foucault, op. cit., and A. Fijalkowski, loc. cit (2005). 
55 M. Łoś (2002), op. cit. 
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3. Post-Communist period (1989 – present) 
Previous research has demonstrated that the collapse of the Communist regime 
has left particular bonds of resistance meaningless and replaced them with new 
threats, manifested in the rising crime rates, which necessitate new strategies 
and ways of coping.56 These new strategies rely on old and well-used methods 
which on the part of Polish society involves retaining the label of ‘them’ as 
concerns the state apparatus.  
 
3.1 European identity and crime control 
This label has been used to identify pro-European policies.57 European identity 
itself is a notion fraught with confusion. As concerns its identity in the criminal law 
area, research has revealed a cosmopolitanism that attaches itself to the identity 
of ‘others’ and the moral suffering the ‘others’ experience at the hands of states 
that do not reflect the European ‘civilisation’.58 This highly debated process 
towards ‘civilising’ argues that there are macro-sociological processes at work 
that eventually result in a refinement and humanisation of penal measures that 
are more in line with values shared by the European community.59 Post-
Communist states have openly declared their affinity with ‘Europe’, some states 
                                                 
56 See A. Fijalkowski (2005),loc. cit. 
57 This is apparent among right-wing political parties in CEE, such as the Polish Law and Justice 
(Prawo i Sprawiedliwość) or Self-Defence (Samoobrona) parties mentioned below. 
58 See E. Girling, ‘European Identity and the Mission against the Death Penalty in the United 
States’ in A. Sarat and C. Boulanger, eds., The Cultural Lives of Capital Punishment: 
Comparative Perspectives (Stanford 2005) pp. 112-128. 
59 See A. Sarat and C. Boulanger, ‘Putting Culture into the Picture: Toward a Comparative 
Analysis of State Killing’, in A. Sarat and C. Boulanger, eds., The Cultural Lives of Capital 
Punishment: Comparative Perspectives (Stanford 2005) pp. 1-45.  
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proclaiming so in constitutional preambles, such as Lithuania, for example.60 Yet 
a seemingly serious mismatch – at least in the area of crime control - exists 
between CEE and European values. A closer examination is warranted, with the 
starting point being culture.61 
Garland’s work examines the manner in which shared values and norms 
have affected forms of punishment in Europe and how the area of crime control 
has been shaped by changing sensibilities and mentalities over time.62 The 
origins of these catalysts for change usually rest with external factors. In this 
vein, both the EU and CEE are affected by values and norms reflected in 
European and international law. When the EU welcomed the post-Communist 
states into ‘Europe’, it opened up formal discussions with the candidate 
countries, drawing attention to the Copenhagen criteria of 1991, which sets out 
the criteria for joining, namely by respecting the rule of law and democracy. The 
EU’s momentum as concerns the ‘promotion’ of human rights took place in the 
1990s, and in 2001 the European Commission indicated that the ‘European 
Union is well placed to promote democracy and human rights…all fifteen 
member states of the Union are democracies espousing the same Treaty-based 
principles in their internal and external policies.’63 A common ground between 
member states, enough to constitute a European identity, seemingly exists. Yet, 
                                                 
60 See J. Priban, ‘Reconstituting Paradise Lost: temporality, civility and ethnicity in postcommunist 
constitution-making’, 38 Law & Society Review (2004) pp. 407-431.  
61 See S. Karstedt, ‘Comparing Cultures, Comparing Crime: Challenges, Prospects and Problems 
for a Global Criminology’, 36 Crime, Law and Social Change (2001) pp. 285-308. 
62 D. Garland, Punishment and Modern Society: a Study in Social Theory (Oxford 1991).  
63 European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament: the European Union’s Role in Promoting Human Rights and Democratization in Third 
Countries’, COM (2001) 252 final, Brussels, 8 May 2001. 
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as Girling aptly observes, at least in the area of crime control European identity – 
if we can identify it as such – has defined itself in response to developments that 
have occurred in the United States and its use of the death penalty.64 These 
European standards are outlined by the Council of Europe norms, which, after 
the collapse of Communism, required candidate countries to ratify key legal 
instruments, in addition to the European Convention on Human Rights, 
abolishing the death penalty, namely Protocol No. 6 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights and Optional Protocol No. 2 of the International Covenant of 
Civil and Political Rights. First, however, Member States had to ensure that these 
relevant instruments were ratified between themselves. The newly selected 
candidate countries were perplexed, as the majority of its populations strongly 
supported the use of capital punishment. It created a rift between the ‘East’ and 
‘West’, once again perplexing, as CEE has felt its place is in the ‘West’, because 
it shares common democratic values.  
 This is not the first time that CEE countries have felt excluded from 
Western Europe. Although the question of geography is relevant, it needs to be 
understood alongside the ‘double exclusion: from their own history thanks to the 
Soviet presence, and from the consciousness of the West.’65 Soviet rule 
established a divide between East and West. Entry into the European Union, as 
noted above, creates a barrier as well, to the surprise of the CEE countries. Judt 
captures the sentiment well when he argues ‘East European writings about West 
Europe in the early fifties [reveals] a reiterated tone of injury and bewildered 
                                                 
64 E. Girling, loc. cit. 
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surprise: of ‘disappointed love’.66 With European enlargement, there was no 
question that CEE countries would seek membership. The ‘wonders’ that the 
West could grant CEE was entangled in the concern about what the East would 
do to the West.67 Cultural inclusiveness, it is argued, was met by technical 
exclusiveness.68 The latter, separating EU Member States from CEE states, is 
rooted in Communist practices, and also needs to be appreciated alongside 
peculiar cultural values. 
Lerch and Schwellnus discuss the problems that arise when ‘double 
standards’ come into question – in other words, the inconsistent application of 
rules’.69 This practice does not necessarily lead to the loss of legitimacy, but if 
the double standards remain unjustified the result might be different. How 
successful the Council of Europe has been in convincing CEE states about 
adopting this correct crime control model is questionable. 
                                                                                                                                                
 
3.2 Post-communist states and crime control 
Concerning the punitive nature of CEE societies, in the area of punishment the 
majority of the CEE population has supported the death penalty for over a 
decade, with the lowest percentage of supporters in 1989, at 52 per cent, rising 
to 77 per cent in 1996. For 2000, 58 per cent of respondents polled ‘definitely’ 
supported the death penalty and 19 per cent responded with a ‘rather yes’; only 8 
 
65 T. Judt, op. cit., p. 202. 
66 T. Judt, op. cit. 
67 T. Judt, op. cit., p. 719. 
68 T. Judt, op. cit., p. 718. 
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per cent surveyed responded with a ‘definitely no’. Polls taken by the Brussels-
based Central European Research Group (CEORG) revealed that 73.6 per cent 
of Poles support the death penalty, alongside 59.8 per cent of Hungarians and 
56.1 per cent of Czechs (CEORG 2002).70 Without doubt, strong support for 
capital punishment is reflected in the Central and East European region. 
In Poland, for example, public views coincide with polls taken as far back 
as 1996, when respondents supported stricter laws under the former criminal 
code.71 Sentiments favouring stricter laws coincide with the increasing fear of 
becoming a victim of a crime, which has been revealed in recent surveys. In 
2000, for example, in another poll conducted by CBOS, two-thirds of Polish 
society expressed such fears.72 These fears are prompted by the fact that 
criminal patterns have changed since the collapse of Communism. While criminal 
statistics are notoriously difficult to evaluate, especially under the former regime, 
studies demonstrate that the number of offences reported has doubled in the ten-
year period following the collapse of Communism.73 Further, it is important to 
point out that the CEE does not share the EU’s view that using the death penalty 
to fight crime is ineffective.74 Deterrence is a notion that is very much alive in the 
CEE region. 
                                                                                                                                                 
69 M. Lerch and G. Schwellnus, ‘Normative by Nature? The Role of Coherence in Justifying the 
EU’s External Human Rights Policy’, 13 Journal of European Public Policy (2006) pp. 304-321. 
70 The study of capital punishment is revealing, in that no other form of punishment evokes such 
moral outrage. See A. Sarat and C. Boulanger, loc.cit. 
71 For reports on surveys carried out in 2000 by the Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej (Public 
Opinion Research Centre), Warsaw, Poland (2000) see 
http://www.cbos.pl/EN/Reports/r2000.shtml  
72 Centrum Badana Opinii Sp Społecznej (Public Opinion Research Centre), loc. cit. 
73 M. Łoś (2002), loc. cit., pp. 180-181. 
74 See M. Lerch and G. Schwellnus, loc. cit., p. 311. 
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This possibly has been even further embraced since the collapse of 
Communism. People are still clearly fearful of becoming a victim. Personal safety 
was perceived differently under the former regime. The reporting of crime and 
criminal statistics were strictly controlled by the regime, which meant that only 
certain crimes were reported, and mostly where crimes were solved and state 
control reinforced.75 Latvia, for example, resisted the Council of Europe’s 
urgency by clearly indicating that the increasing crime rates had to be comb
by retaining the death penalty for a temporary period. Albania has argued 
ated 
 
rally showed an increase 




 In its 2005 report in feelings of insecurity and fears of crime, the European 
Crime Prevention Network compared Western European states with CEE 
countries,76 it was revealed that fears of personal safety were higher in CEE
countries as opposed to Western European states, including industrialised 
countries. Between 1992 and 2000, CEE states gene
b
 
3.2.1 Role of the media 
Clearly the rise in crime has been accompanied by open reporting. Curry notes 
that its current nature is characterised by a swift discarding of old structures, and
with the arrival en masse of new journalists which the ‘media’s messages were
                                                 
75 M. Łoś (2002), loc. cit., pp. 168-169. 
76 A Review of Scientifically Evaluated Good Practices for Reducing Feelings of Insecurity or Fear 
of Crime in the EU Member States, European Crime Prevention Network, European Commission, 
2005. 
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often far more negative than anything Eastern Europeans had seen’77 In most 
news reports, crime coverage is uncensored and, in addition, the criminal jus
apparatus is ‘exposed’ in its failures. While the media tends to focus on the 
sensational cases of failure, the public is left with a negative, general impression 
of a system that is characterised by chaos and corruption. The public perceptio
that crime is increasing is reinforced this way. Crime control is an issue that is










                                                
78 As the feelings of insecur
increase coincide with calls for stricter crime control, populist government 
campaigns increase their popularity. In ce
er role of the church in public life.  
Returning to the Polish experience, one of the key institutions which 
supported Poles in their struggle for independence during the Partitio
Communist rule has been the Catholic Church. For a society that is 
predominantly Catholic, the religious theme is not an accident, nor is the strong 
sense of statehood. Misztal ventures, ‘[T]he partition of Poland in the eightee
century gave the country an essential identity as “the Christ among nations: 
crucified and recrucified by foreign oppression”, and through this established 
prism of victimhood many Poles still interpret their national fate’.79 The Church 
was ‘pushed on to the fringes of political life’,80 during both the pre-war and post-
war periods. The Church had leaders of charismatic and outstanding personali
who were called upon by the government to exercise restraint during times of 
 
ry of Poland, Vol. II (Oxford 1991), p. 404. 
77 J.L. Curry, loc. cit., p. 160.  
78 M. Łoś (2002), loc. cit., pp. 166-167. 
79 B. Misztal, Theories of Social Remembering (Maidenhead, UK 2003), p. 16. 
80 N. Davies, God’s Playground: a Histo
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political discontent.81 Poles could attend unofficial sermons which would reiterate
that ‘Poles are slaves in their own country’ and which wield much influen










                                                
82 The 
Communist government may have operated as a one-Party state, but it both 
feared and envied the prestige and popularity of the clergy.83 In public op
surveys concerning public attitudes towards key organisations in Poland 
conducted in 1981, 95 per cent of respondents expressed their trust in the 
Solidarity opposition movement, 94 per cent in the Church, 50 per cent in the 
police, and only seven per cent in the Communist Party.84 Kurczewski notes t
the political deficiency of the Communist era was filled by the Church.85 And 
while Poland has had a tradition of democratic thought, ‘it has been the Church 
that helped the Polish people to survive as a nation, to nurture their democratic 
ethos and to continue their struggle for liberation and self-rule’.86 This identity
has roots in conservative values firmly entrenched in a traditionally conservative 
nation. Interestingly, researchers into crime generally focused on challenging t
f the socialist economy rather than those of the Church and tradition.87 
Concerning Łoś’s observation about society’s search for space to disc
fears, the Polish Catholic radio station, Radio Marja (Maria), seems to have 
successfully filled this lacunae; its success is owing to the societal disillusion wit
 
81 N. Davies, op. cit., p. 614. 
82 N. Davies, op. cit., p. 614. 
83 N. Davies, op. cit., p. 613. 
84 See M. Łoś, op. cit., p. 37. 
85 As observed by J. Kurczewski, ‘The Old System and the Revolution’, in Sisyphus: Sociological 
Studies, Vol. III: Crisis and Conflicts: the Case of Poland 1980-81, (1982), as quoted in See M. 
Łoś, op. cit, p. 216. 
86 As observed by J. Kurczewski, loc. cit., as quoted in M. Łoś, op. cit, p. 295. 
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capitalism and EU enlargement. The radio station’s popularity, reaching two to 
three million listeners, is evident when one considers the last local elections, held 
in 2005. The parties supported by the station, Liga Polskich Rodzin (League of 
Polish Families) and Samoobrona (‘Self Defence’), together gained 33 per cent 
of the votes, overtaking the ruling socialists. The station also is renowned for its 
enophobic and nationalist overtones. 
 
to a the ‘status of a sort of 
court correspondent’,88 has fortified these positions.89 
                                                                                
x
 
3.2.2  Political campaigns and their implications 
Concerning political implications, as Mayor of Warsaw, the present Polish 
president ran a successful campaign that supported a tougher stance on crime 
and the re-instatement of capital punishment. The PiS (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość) 
(Law and Justice) party, strengthened by the President and his brother’s rise to 
post as Prime Minister, has managed to present its tough approach on crime as
a reflection of the norms and values shared by Polish society. Certainly recent 
poll suggests so – as the party’s popularity is on the rise, secured by a reliance 
on campaigns in more rural areas of the country, as well as galvanising support 
from listeners of Radio Marja (Maria), which has risen 
                                                                 
l.com: the European Magazine at 
87 This is especially true of research into crimes committed by women. See M. Łoś, op. cit., p. 
248. 
88 See Sarah Elsig, ‘Piety and Xenophobia on Poland’s Short Wave’ 28 May 2004, (see 
cafebabe
http://www.cafebabel.com/en/article.asp?T=T&Id=1854 (last visited 14 March 2007)). See also, 
N.Watt, ‘Anti-semitism live’, Guardian Unlimited 5 June 2006 (see 




A return to conservative values clearly is the key to the current 
government’s policies. Prime Minister Kaczyński’s position is that the state ‘shall 
protect the foundations of social life, so that Polish families can endure (...) 
marriage is a union between a man and a woman,’ He also supports a stronger 
role of the Church in public life, arguing that ‘[t]o smite the institution of the 
Church is like smiting the foundations of Polish national life,’ a point reiterated by 
the President. ‘The Church is the depository of the only commonly known and 
observed system of values. In this respect, Poland is almost a uniform country.’90 
The commonly shared values extend to crime control, a point re-visited recently 
with the capital sentence imposed by Iraqi courts against Saddam Hussein. The 
Polish President has been a strong advocate of re-introducing the sentence. 
‘Countries that give up this penalty award an unimaginable advantage to the 
criminal over his victim, the advantage of life over death’.91 This is advocated by 
other CEE countries, such as the Ukraine, which supports Iraq’s sovereignty of 
the question. The Council of Europe has responded that ‘death penalty has no 
place in the criminal justice system of any modern, civilised country’.92 Some 
commentators, such as Smith, observe that ‘[w]hat the Council of Europe did was 
to exercise the coercive powers they had over these young, fragile, emerging 
                                                                                                                                                 
89 These shifts in the character governance in Poland is not a new development. For example, the 
first Polish president, Lech Wałęsa stylised himself very much as the pre-war President Josef 
Piłsudski, an authoritarian leader who led a campaign of sanitation. These efforts, alongside 
conservative values, are what characterise the current regime and are the key to its popularity. 
90 See ‘Government Starts Work’, Warsaw Voice 2 August 2006 (see 
http://www.warsawvoice.pl/view/11969 ). 
91 C.S. Smith, ‘In Europe, It’s East v. West on the Death Penalty’, New York Times 19 November 
2006. 
92 ‘EU rebukes President Kaczynski on death sentence statement’, The Warsaw Voice, 29 August 
2006. See also Nicholas Watt, ‘Polish PM softens rightwing stance after EU protests’, The 
Guardian 31 August 2006, p. 24. 
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democracies who all want to join the big club of the Council of Europe with a view
to joining the economic club of the EU in the future’.
 
d 
e concerning the feelings of trust 






                                                
93 The results of widesprea
perception of a security crisis include both social disruptions and considerable 
changes to the value and role of the society in th
 
4. Future of democracy 
The sentiments expressed by CEE countries reflect views on crime, risk, and 
security. They indicate a direction in response to the dynamics of crime in a time
of considerable social change. This is not only concentrated in the CEE region, 
indeed, a similar debate is ongoing across Europe and ‘a number of Anglophone 
[….] governments [that] have increasingly sought to bring the general p
al sentiments within their framework for policy development’.95  
There seem to be good reasons to doubt existing arrangements in criminal 
policy and institutions of social control that require reform.96 The European C
Prevention Network’s report shows that fears of crime are localised among
people who in actual fact are at low risk of being a victim of crime. Whilst 
practical measures can be instituted, the question remains that concerns a fear 
of crime and insecurity that is rooted in extended experience of the failure of the 
 
93 C.S. Smith, loc. cit. 
94 A. Fatić, op. cit. p. 2. See also his Punishment and Restorative Crime Handling: a Social 
Theory of Trust (Aldershot 1995). 
95 See J. Pratt and M. Clark, ‘Penal Populism in New Zealand’, Punishment and Society, 7 
(2005), p. 303. See D. Garland, op cit. 
96 See, for example, D. Garland, op. cit. 
 24
state and its public order and criminal justice institutions to respond adequately
providing protection and basic security. 
 The rise in criminality is often seen as a sign of disregarding significant
social relationships, and that especially severe and intrusive forms of crim
control are a sign of the incompetence of social institutions to counteract this 
process effectively. This factor has been addressed with respect to Latin 
America, where crime has risen at an alarming pace, and the implementation of 
measures, such as the appearance of more police has resulted in conflicting 









, yet some commentators, such as 
97 Likewi
has been shown that support for authoritarian regimes can stem from feelings o
insecurity and vulnerability.98 The decay in social relationships and trust
assumed to constitute the specifically social dimensions of criminality. If th
correct, than the ‘social tissue’ in post-Communist Europe is extremely 
threatened.99 The efforts of the Council of Europe can, perhaps, exert an 
influence on changing attitudes with respect to crime control, but this will be 
severely hindered if existing practices deriving under the former regime continu
to have a considerable influence on attitudes and perceptions of law and order. 
Civil society plays a key role in this process
                                                 
97 M.S. Bergman, ‘Crime and Security in Latin America: The Challenges for New Scholarship’, 41 
ch Review (2006) pp. 213-227. See also O.J. Pérez, ‘Democratic 
security: Crime and Democracy in El Salvador and Guatemala’, 118 
Latin American Resear
Legitimacy and Public In
Political Science Quarterly (2003-4) pp. 627-645. 
98 O.J. Pérez, loc. cit.  









operation’.103 Dissolution with democracy can lead to alternative modes of 
                                                
owicz, see the once-important intelligentsia failing it its responsibility in the 
democratic process in the CEE region.100  
The increase in crime has a ‘destructive potential [. . .], as it leads to high 
publicity and has the ability to generate negative and often romanticised deviant 
stereotypes that call for imitation and following.’101 By generating an inte
in society, the erosion of trust in the ability of the criminal justice system to offe
adequate protection is compromised. This sort of discourse of political 
legitimation that has been adopted by the media and politicians is reflected
many countries for the introduction or reintroduction of the death penalty, for 
increased use of life imprisonment, or other repressive measures against 
criminality. This discourse has potentially further volatile consequences when 
one considers that certain areas of knowledge are kept away from CEE societies 
for fear of eroding ‘Europeanisation’.102 This selective process of forgetting and 
remembering hinders the entrenchment of democratic values. By examining this 
one aspect of crime, risk, and security, it becomes evident that the challenge for 
the EU and CEE governments to implement measures that strengthen the sen
of security through deepening and strengthening democratic values, via judicial 
reform for example, are meaningless unless the courts are provided with th
‘basic contextual knowledge [with respect to the Communist regime’s] mode o
 
100 A. Zybertowicz, ‘Hidden Actors, Overlooked Dimensions and Blind Intellectuals: Nine 
Paradoxes that Account for Institutionally Entrenched Ignorance’, draft paper for Building Civil 
Society and Democracy East of the Elbe (2002), on file with author. 
101 A. Fatić, supra n. 18, p. 2. 
102 A. Zybertowicz, ‘The Art of Forgetting: the Communist Police-State as a Non-Reality’, draft 
paper (2006), on file with author. 













thoughtful strategies that draw on the particular experiences of the 
region. 
                                                
governance that can result in bringing into law seemingly popular sentiments 
concerning law and order.104 If successful these national movements se
li
 
5. Concluding remarks 
This article examined crime, risk, and security in CEE during Communist and 
post-Communist rule. It considered the nature of Communist rule, shaped by 
repressive measures and the use of terror, which affected the way in whi
societies perceive law and order. In the post-Communist period the EU, 
particularly through the Council of Europe, has played a significant role in calling
upon CEE states to strengthen democracy and the rule of law. However, in
area of crime control, there is a marked divergence in traditional and local 
concerns as concerns crime and security, the extent to which they continue to
shaped by Communist rule, the manner in which these assert themselves in 
media reporting and political campaigns, that are at odds with global patterns o
thought. Whilst this demonstrates a trend appearing across several regions
nonetheless provides a critical portrait of post-Communist Europe that h
serious consequences for the entrenchment of democratic values and 
appreciation of peculiar cultural values – which, if they are deserving of chan
warrant 
 
104 See J. Pratt and M. Clark, loc. cit. 
